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China’s Central Bank Urges Banks to Maintain Stable Property Financing

China’s financial regulators have asked banks to stabilize lending to property developers and construction firms, the latest effort by policymakers to turn around the real-estate crisis and bolster economic growth.

Authorities support the “reasonable” extension of existing real estate development loans and trust loans, according to a statement posted on the People’s Bank of China’s website after a Monday meeting with commercial banks. The gathering was jointly organized by the central bank and the banking regulator.

The regulators reiterated that the “reasonable” demand of home buyers for mortgages will be met. A key financing support program must be “used well” to help private property developers sell bonds, while legal protection and regulatory policy support for special loans aimed at ensuring housing-project delivery will be improved to promote the stable and healthy development of the market, the statement said.

The call is the latest in a slew of actions taken by the government to try to stop the more-than-yearlong slump in the real estate market that’s dragging down China’s economic growth and undermining local-government income. Bond defaults by cash-strapped developers have sent shockwaves across the financial markets, while delays in property-project delivery have driven homebuyers to stop mortgage payments in protest.

In a possible sign of willingness to shift away from the previous tightening stance on the real estate sector, PBOC Governor Yi Gang emphasized Monday that the industry is critical for the economy. “The property sector is linked to many upstream and downstream industries, and its healthy operating cycle is significant for the economy,” Yi said at a financial forum in Beijing.

Meanwhile, the PBOC is planning to provide 200 billion yuan ($28 billion) in interest-free relending loans to commercial banks through the end of March, 2023, in a move to support them to provide matching funds for stalled property projects, China Business News reported, citing the central bank’s meeting with commercial banks on Monday.

Adding to the positive messages sent by the authorities, Yi Huiman, chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, said at the same event that his agency will support property developers’ reasonable bond financing needs and support mergers and acquisitions in the sector.

Support Package

The main points from Monday’s meeting are similar to a 16-point package authorities rolled out earlier this month to help embattled developers, who have at least $292 billion of onshore and offshore borrowing maturing through the end of next year. The push followed regulators’ orders for banks to dole out hundreds of billions of yuan in financing for developers in the remainder of this year.

The remarks by Yi Gang are “a rare recognition of the property sector’s irreplaceable significance” by a top financial official, according to Lu Ting, chief China economist at Nomura Holdings Inc. in Hong Kong. The government’s recent supportive policies “demonstrate that Beijing is willing to reverse most of its financial-tightening measures,” he added.

At the meeting on Monday, the PBOC and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission also urged banks to expand medium- and long-term lending to help policy bank financing drive effective investment. Credit demand from manufacturers and service providers should be supported via the special relending loan program for equipment upgrading, the regulators added.

Yi said at the forum that the outstanding size of the relending programs targeting sectors such as technology innovation, transport and logistics and equipment upgrading is about 3 trillion yuan ($419 billion), adding they will be ended after policy goals are reached.

Stocks Down

A Bloomberg gauge of Chinese developers’ stocks ended the day 2% lower, after sinking as much as 4% in the morning. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Property Index closed 0.5% lower after earlier being down 2.7%.

PBOC Deputy Governor Pan Gongsheng and CBIRC Vice Chairman Xiao Yuanqi made comments at the Monday meeting, which was attended by heads of institutions including the major state-owned banks, joint stock lenders, and the branches of the central bank and the banking regulator, according to the statement.


Source : BNN Bloomberg


Chart: American Soaring Debt Payment Wiped Out Savings

Source : Bloomberg

Infographic: FTX’s Leaked Balance Sheet

See large image . . . . . .

Source : Visual Capitalist

Chart: U.S. Government Debt Interest Payment % of GDP

Source : Convoy Investments

Central Banks Are Losing Billions, Wiping Out Profits

Enda Curran, Jana Randow and Jonnelle Marte wrote . . . . . . . . .

Profits and losses aren’t usually thought of as a consideration for central banks, but rapidly mounting red ink at the Federal Reserve and many peers risks becoming more than just an accounting oddity.

The bond market is enduring its worst selloff in a generation, triggered by high inflation and the aggressive interest-rate hikes that central banks are implementing. Falling bond prices, in turn, mean paper losses on the massive holdings that the Fed and others accumulated during their rescue efforts in recent years.

Rate hikes also involve central banks paying out more interest on the reserves that commercial banks park with them. That’s tipped the Fed into operating losses, creating a hole that may ultimately require the Treasury Department to fill via debt sales. The UK Treasury is already preparing to make up a loss at the Bank of England.

Britain’s move highlights a dramatic shift in countries including the US, where central banks are no longer significant contributors to government revenues. The US Treasury will see a “stunning swing,” going from receiving about $100 billion last year from the Fed to a potential annual loss rate of $80 billion by year-end, according to Amherst Pierpont Securities LLC.

The accounting losses threaten to fuel criticism of the asset purchase programs undertaken to rescue markets and economies, most recently when Covid-19 shuttered large swathes of the global economy in 2020. Coinciding with the current outbreak in inflation, that could spur calls to rein in monetary policy makers’ independence, or limit what steps they can take in the next crisis.

“The problem with central bank losses are not the losses per se — they can always be recapitalized — but the political backlash central banks are likely to increasingly face,” said Jerome Haegeli, chief economist at Swiss Re, who previously worked at Switzerland’s central bank.

The following figures illustrate the scope of operating losses or mark-to-market balance-sheet losses now materializing:

  • Fed remittances owed to the US Treasury reached a negative $5.3 billion as of Oct. 19 — a sharp contrast with the positive figures seen as recently as the end of August. A negative number amounts to an IOU that would be repaid via any future income.
  • The Reserve Bank of Australia posted an accounting loss of A$36.7 billion ($23 billion) for the 12 months through June, leaving it with a A$12.4 billion negative-equity position.
  • Dutch central bank Governor Klaas Knot, warned last month he expects cumulative losses of about 9 billion euro ($8.8 billion) for the coming years.
  • The Swiss National Bank reported a loss of 95.2 billion francs ($95 billion) for the first six months of the year as the value of its foreign-exchange holdings slumped — the worst first-half performance since it was established in 1907.

While for a developing country, losses at the central bank can undermine confidence and contribute to a general exodus of capital, that sort of credibility challenge isn’t likely for a rich nation.

As Seth Carpenter, chief global economist for Morgan Stanley and a former US Treasury official put it: “The losses don’t have a material effect on their ability to conduct monetary policy in the near term.”

RBA Deputy Governor Michele Bullock said in response to a question last month about the Australian central bank’s negative-equity position that “we don’t believe that we are impacted at all in our capacity to operate.” After all, “we can create money. That’s what we did when we bought the bonds,” she noted.

But there can still be consequences. Central banks had already become politically charged institutions after, by their own admission, they failed to anticipate and act quickly against budding inflation over the past year or more. Incurring losses adds another magnet for criticism.

ECB Implications

For the European Central Bank, the potential for mounting losses comes after years of purchases of government bonds conducted despite the reservations of conservative officials arguing they blurred the lines between monetary and fiscal policy.

With inflation running at five times the ECB’s target, pressure is mounting to dispose of the bond holdings — a process called quantitative tightening that the ECB is currently preparing for even as the economic outlook darkens.

“Although there are no clear economic constraints to the central bank running losses, there is the possibility that these become more of a political constraint on the ECB,” Goldman Sachs Group Inc. economists George Cole and Simon Freycenet said. Particularly in northern Europe, it “may fuel the discussion of quantitative tightening.”

President Christine Lagarde hasn’t given any indication that the ECB’s decision on QT will be driven by the prospect of incurring losses. She told lawmakers in Brussels last month that generating profits isn’t part of central banks’ task, insisting that fighting inflation remains policymakers’ “only purpose.”

BOJ, Fed

The Bank of Japan remains apart for now, not having raised interest rates and still imposing a negative rate on a portion of banks’ reserves. But things could change when Governor Haruhiko Kuroda steps down in April, and his successor is confronted by historically high inflation.

As for the Fed, Republicans have in the past voiced opposition to its practice of paying interest on surplus bank reserves. Congress granted that authority back in 2008 to help the Fed control interest rates. With the Fed now incurring losses, and the Republicans potentially taking control of at least one chamber of Congress in the November midterm elections, the debate may resurface.

The Fed’s turnaround could be particularly notable. After paying as much as $100 billion to the Treasury in 2021, it could face losses of more than $80 billion on an annual basis if policymakers raise rates by 75 basis points in November and 50 basis points in December — as markets anticipate — estimates Stephen Stanley, chief economist for Amherst Pierpont.

Without the income from the Fed, the Treasury then needs to sell more debt to the public to fund government spending.

“This may be too arcane to hit the public’s radar, but a populist could spin the story in a way that would not reflect well on the Fed,” Stanley wrote in a note to clients this month.


Source : BNN Bloomberg

Chart: U.S. Personal Saving Rate Plunged to Multi-year Low in September 2022

Source : Bloomberg

Chart: U.K. Families Spend A Third Of Their Income On Childcare

Source : Statista

Rebooting Hong Kong as an International Financial Center

James A Fok wrote . . . . . . . . .

Coming out of a period of social unrest and the pandemic, Hong Kong is gearing up to recover lost ground. But doubts loom about the city’s ability to retain and strengthen its long-held role as an international financial center, especially in the context of the US-China great power rivalry. Financial advisor James Fok, author of the book, Financial Cold War, weighs in on how Hong Kong’s resilient financial markets can exploit the city’s advantages to shore up its position in global finance and what it needs to do to overcome the challenges ahead.

Champagne corks were popping all over Hong Kong following the September 23 announcement by the government that it was scrapping compulsory quarantine for inbound travelers. The restrictions, in effect for 915 days, had exacted a heavy toll on the economy and morale in the Chinese special administrative region (SAR), whose second largest industry before Covid-19 had been tourism. As the city’s retailers and restauranteurs, as well as its flagship airline Cathay Pacific, can start to look forward to a return to normality, however, questions over the future of Hong Kong’s largest industry – financial services – linger.

More than just a key pillar of its own economy, Hong Kong’s capital markets play a critical role in facilitating trade and investment between China and the rest of the world. But the SAR’s standing as an international financial center has in recent years suffered numerous blows, both self-inflicted and outside its control.

In some ways, it is remarkable how resilient Hong Kong’s financial markets have been. In the wake of widespread social unrest in 2019 and in the midst of a global pandemic, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEX), the city’s sole exchange operator, reported a record year for derivatives trading volumes and its second best-ever annual turnover in stocks in 2021. This is testament to Hong Kong’s unique advantages under the “one country, two systems” model governing the SAR since its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Structural shifts in its internal and external environments, however, have created both significant challenges and huge new opportunities. If Hong Kong is to retain its status as a leading international financial center, then it must adapt to these changes and take proactive steps to prepare for the future.

What are the key changes in Hong Kong’s operating environment?

Hong Kong ascended the ranks of the world’s leading financial centers over the past three decades by serving as the principal venue for China’s offshore capital formation. Since the first listing of mainland Chinese H-shares in 1993, the city’s stock market capitalization has risen 18-fold from around US$250 billion to US$4.5 trillion, while average daily share turnover has surged more than 30-fold from under US$650 million to over US$21 billion in 2021.

The underlying drivers of this success were Hong Kong’s unique position as part of China but operating under an English common law system and internationally accepted regulatory standards, China’s massive capital import needs, and other factors such as the city’s sound financial infrastructure, strong pool of talent, and innovative spirit. While dramatic changes have taken place since the 1990s, in light of the rapidly evolving business, geopolitical and technological landscapes, further structural transformations will throw up new competitive and regulatory challenges.

First, China’s rapid economic development means that it now has different financial needs. The funding requirements of Chinese companies can comfortably be met from domestic sources, whereas a rapidly ageing demographic profile means that Chinese policymakers now face pressures to help their citizens achieve better diversification and returns on their retirement savings.

Today, the largest allocation of Chinese household wealth is to residential real estate, followed by cash deposits at banks – which amounted to some US$35 trillion in 2021. Given the small size of China’s domestic capital markets relative to its economy, some proportion of these Chinese savings will need to be invested in international markets if the country is to avoid dangerous domestic asset price bubbles.

Bonds tend to make up the larger part of pensions savings. Hong Kong’s financial sector, however, is overwhelmingly skewed towards the listing and trading of equity securities; its bond markets remain small and its capabilities to serve fixed-income issuers and investors are limited. Even in equities, the SAR does not offer mainland investors much in terms of diversification opportunities, with mainland Chinese companies accounting for 78 percent of its stock market capitalization and 88 percent of trading turnover. Hong Kong’s failure to diversify its market has therefore left it ill equipped to cater to China’s retirement savings needs today.

In time, as the working age share of China’s population shrinks, government borrowing will likely rise to meet increasing social welfare spending needs. To support these increased borrowing requirements, international investors will demand similar levels of capital and liquidity efficiency from their holdings of Chinese Government Bonds (CGBs) as they enjoy with other major sovereign securities. Catering to these requirements will involve enhancing post-trade efficiencies and developing collateral management capabilities that Hong Kong does not yet possess.

Second, Hong Kong is now facing rising competition both from the mainland and internationally. Its relationship with mainland Chinese financial centers, particularly Shanghai and Shenzhen, is evolving from one of “co-opetition” to one of increasingly intense rivalry. Both centers harbor international ambitions and, while Hong Kong continues to have the advantages of an open capital account and international regulatory standards, the gaps have significantly narrowed in recent years. The launch in 2019 of Shanghai’s STAR market, with its more flexible listing requirements, was aimed directly at wresting mainland technology IPOs from Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the Chinese government’s focus on the goal of “common prosperity” could lead to further curtailment of offshore listings by Chinese companies as a means for mainland entrepreneurs to transfer their wealth overseas.

On the international front, the proliferation of algorithmic trading strategies has made major liquidity providers more market and asset-class agnostic. More and more investors are focusing on markets where they can achieve the best overall returns, net of costs. Here, Hong Kong has been poorly served by the monopolies controlling its core market infrastructure, which have had little pressure or incentive to invest in upgrading and enhancing the efficiency of their platforms. As a result, even disregarding the city’s stamp duty on share trading, investors in Hong Kong face steep fees and costs compared with other major markets.

Third, developments over the past several years have undoubtedly tarnished Hong Kong’s international standing. The underlying factors that precipitated the 2019 protests are complex and stretch back many decades, but the sight of violent unrest on the city’s streets broadcast across international news media badly damaged its reputation for offering a safe and stable living and working environment. While Beijing’s enactment in 2020 of the National Security Law (NSL) helped restore order to the SAR, it has also raised concerns among the international community that Hong Kong’s civil liberties are being curtailed. In response, the US sanctioned Hong Kong officials, and a number of countries relaxed immigration policies for people wanting to leave the city, particularly those facing possible legal prosecution.

In August, the South China Morning Post reported that more than 113,000 Hong Kong residents, or 1.6 percent of the population, had emigrated over the past 12 months in what is seen as the most severe brain drain since the years in the run-up to China’s resumption of sovereignty. Undoubtedly, this included many expatriates who had grown weary of harsh Covid-related travel restrictions, but most of those departing were native Hong Kongers. Confronted with Hong Kong’s sky-high property prices and highly unequal access to education and other opportunities, middle class professionals had been seeking better lives elsewhere for their families long before 2019. Lower eligibility criteria to enter countries including Australia, Britain, Canada and the US since 2020 have simply opened the door for many more to emigrate. Unless it can be stemmed, this loss of talent will pose serious long-term challenges to Hong Kong’s competitiveness.

Meanwhile, social instability and the continued failure to address the underlying problems have undermined confidence among mainland Chinese constituencies. As China continues to race ahead in key areas of technology and infrastructure, Hong Kong’s privileged status could well be further called into question.

Fourth, increasingly strained relations between China and the US and the weaponization of the global financial system pose particularly complex challenges for Hong Kong. In the short term, while US restrictions on investment in certain Chinese sectors and the threat of de-listing facing US-listed Chinese companies may lead to an increase in secondary listings in Hong Kong, if widening geo-economic warfare begins to curtail cross-border capital flows, it will pose a significant blow to city’s financial services sector.

China’s continued dependence on the US dollar and Western control over key global financial infrastructure present major challenges in expanding Chinese outbound portfolio investment. International investment programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), designed partly to help improve returns on China’s US$3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, rely on foreign direct investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises. This has given rise to concerns over Chinese government influence in recipient countries, exacerbating geopolitical tensions. Without security against Western sanctions, however, Chinese policymakers are unwilling to relax restrictions further on portfolio investment in overseas securities markets.

Nevertheless, the unprecedented financial sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its military aggression in Ukraine could lead to major shifts in policy. To date, Chinese policymakers have taken a cautious and gradual approach towards internationalizing their currency, wary of shouldering the burdens the US faces due to the dollar’s global utility role. The freezing of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves has highlighted the risk of China’s continued reliance on the dollar and could prompt accelerated steps to internationalize the renminbi.

Other countries are also reconsidering their choice of currencies for trade settlements and reserve holdings. Saudi Arabia’s move to begin accepting renminbi to settle oil exports to China means that, based on current export levels and oil prices, the Saudi treasury alone could have as much as US$75-100 billion in renminbi-denominated reinvestment requirements a year going forward. Reports that companies from India and other countries trading with Russia have begun settling trade in renminbi also suggest that the offshore yuan pool could grow substantially in the coming years. This represents an enormous opportunity for Hong Kong, but there will be fierce competition from other international financial centers to satisfy the growing demand for offshore renminbi-denominated investment products.

Fifth, even absent geopolitical tensions, the financial services industry has been evolving rapidly. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, financial regulators have imposed significantly greater regulatory requirements on banks and other financial intermediaries. This was undoubtedly necessary, given that inadequate capital and liquidity buffers had contributed to the crisis. The new rules, however, have led to a reconfiguration of business models, where risks have migrated to other nodes in the financial system and fresh ones have emerged.

For example, the exit by investment banks from proprietary trading means that market liquidity today depends more heavily on less well capitalized market-making firms. This has made financial markets more susceptible to shocks arising from rapid liquidity withdrawal. Meanwhile, the drive towards central clearing, while helping to increase market transparency, has concentrated risks in clearing houses.

In the asset management sector, rapid growth in passive index-tracking funds has put pressure on fees, which in turn is driving a greater focus on costs. Cost pressures, along with the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), have forced an unbundling of services traditionally provided by brokers and investment banks, with a host of new providers stepping in.

All financial centers must strike a balance between providing a flexible environment, in which new business models can develop, and appropriate regulatory oversight. Hong Kong, however, also faces a struggle to gain greater influence in the formulation of global financial standards.

Sixth, exponential advances in technology are accelerating the process of creative destruction. Among the most revolutionary technologies in financial markets today is blockchain. Looking beyond the speculative frenzy in cryptocurrencies, blockchain’s capabilities promise to bring about substantial cost and other efficiencies in trade processing and settlement. But new technological capabilities are changing the financial ecosystem in other ways.

The success of the large-scale experiment in working from home during the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to accelerate trends in the outsourcing of higher-end services and will require financial centers to accommodate remote business models in their regulatory and infrastructure set-ups.

Hong Kong, like other major markets, has experienced huge growth in high frequency trading (HFT) volumes, which rely heavily on algorithmic models. As the May 2010 US flash crash bore witness, malfunctioning algorithms can cause extreme market volatility. Notwithstanding the enormous impact of HFT activity, regulators remain several steps behind market developments.

Technology is not only altering the structure of markets at the institutional level. Today, low-cost online brokers offer retail investors analytical tools that were only available to the most sophisticated institutions just a decade ago. Mobile applications have also made trading more accessible. Consequently, more retail investors are participating in more complex products such as derivatives. This presents dilemmas about the extent to which regulations should restrict access to certain investment products, and the risk that doing so will only drive them to competing financial centers, where protections may be fewer.

Given the scale of these structural changes in its operating environment, Hong Kong needs to craft a comprehensive strategy to meet the evolving needs of its various constituencies and to grasp emerging new opportunities.

How should Hong Kong respond?

Hong Kong has had some success in diversifying its financial services offerings over the past decade. Notable achievements have included the Stock and Bond Connect programs, which have facilitated access for international investors seeking to invest in the Chinese onshore securities markets and enabled individual mainland investors to invest directly in securities listed in Hong Kong for the first time. In addition, the 2018 Listing Reforms significantly increased the attractiveness of its market for mainland technology and biotech company listings. These initiatives, however, mostly focus on more of the same – the listing and trading of shares in mainland Chinese companies.

A strategy for long-term success must concentrate on those opportunities where Hong Kong has, or can develop, sustainable competitive advantages and incorporate key capability building. Opportunities meeting these criteria include:

Serving Chinese savers’ international investment and diversification needs

This would involve two parallel initiatives. First, Hong Kong must seek to attract more share and bond issuance by international issuers. Second, it should seek to support mainland Chinese portfolio investment in international markets beyond Hong Kong.

The key enablers of Chinese outbound investment beyond Hong Kong would be: (i) a secure safekeeping infrastructure to protect mainland investors from foreign sanctions, and (ii) a high degree of transparency for Chinese regulators over their investors’ transactions and holdings in international securities, since, unlike their US counterparts, they do not have the ability impose Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) requirements on the rest of the world.

The Connect programs already provide an established mechanism for transparency. Furthermore, over 70 percent of all international investors’ holdings of mainland A-shares are held through Stock Connect, and some 53 percent of foreign holdings in the Chinese domestic bond market are held through Bond Connect, making Hong Kong the largest safekeeping center for international investors’ holdings of domestic Chinese securities. The principal reason why overseas investors have chosen to entrust these holdings to Hong Kong is because they feel they enjoy greater legal and regulatory protections in the SAR versus investing directly in the onshore market. As part of China, Hong Kong can be trusted to provide similar protections to mainland investors when they invest overseas.

Helping expand international demand for Chinese Government Bonds

To increase international demand for CGBs, investors must be offered similar levels of efficiency in these holdings as they enjoy when investing in US Treasuries. CGBs are not yet widely accepted as collateral for short-term borrowing or to satisfy clearing margin requirements in international markets, and they lack an established infrastructure for their placement and acceptance as collateral. One challenge is that few international investors would be willing to rely on a pledge of collateral under mainland Chinese law. This could be resolved by using Hong Kong as the jurisdiction of pledge since its English common law system is acceptable to both Chinese and international institutions.

At this point, readers might ask: Given the enormous savings of Chinese households, cannot Chinese government borrowing needs be satisfied from domestic sources? In short, no. The time when China’s government borrowing needs begin to rise sharply coincides with the time that Chinese savers going into retirement will be rapidly drawing down their savings. Further, on balance, it would be of greater benefit to China for Chinese savers to invest in higher-yielding assets globally, with foreign investors helping to fund China’s government borrowing needs. China’s demographically driven financial challenges cannot therefore be resolved without greater reliance on international markets.

Supporting a more international role for the renminbi

So far, Hong Kong’s claim to be a renminbi hub has largely rested on having the largest amount of offshore renminbi deposits. It has been slow to develop more of the yuan-denominated investment products that must be available offshore to encourage wider acceptance of the Chinese currency in international trade. Far more concerted efforts are required to build this ecosystem of renminbi products to meet growing demand.

Hong Kong, however, must also anticipate that greater international usage of the renminbi in financial markets will involve products issued and traded in other financial centers. The success of London, Brussels and Luxembourg in cementing lynchpin roles in the Eurodollar system has relied on post-trade services, including clearing, cross-border settlements, securities safekeeping, and collateral management. Here, Hong Kong’s competitive advantage will derive from catering to international investment needs of mainland investors, but it must invest in developing world class post-trade systems and capabilities.

Servicing the financial needs of the wider Asian time zone

For far too long, Hong Kong has neglected the huge opportunities in Southeast Asia and beyond. Rapid growth in both GDP and wealth makes the Asian region one of the most exciting prospects in global markets. But the fragmented nature of the region’s capital markets, with multiple national exchanges, each with limited liquidity, has been an obstacle to attracting international investors and to retaining issuance activity by their local corporations. Nevertheless, intraregional rivalries and failure to develop a regional central securities depository (CSD) to support cross-border settlements have stymied past attempts to pool regional liquidity, such as the ill-fated ASEAN Trading Link.

Competitive and geopolitical tensions mean that Hong Kong will face institutional and political resistance if it were to seek dominance as an IPO center for Southeast Asian issuers. Yet, helping to connect mainland Chinese and international investors in the Hong Kong market to other financial regional markets would be a win-win proposition.

Another major challenge for Asian countries has been the limited acceptance of their sovereign securities as good collateral in international markets. At this point, it is unknown whether growing questions about the dollar system will result in a bipolar global currency regime, in which the renminbi becomes the clear alternative to the greenback, or if we will move to a more multipolar system. Hong Kong should prepare for each eventuality by supporting the expansion of Asian local currency markets through facilitating acceptance of regional sovereign securities as good collateral.

As HKEX develops more derivatives based on regional benchmarks, there are natural reasons for Hong Kong’s clearing houses to accept regional government bonds to meet their margin requirements. But by developing its collateral management capabilities, Hong Kong could also support placement and acceptance of these securities as collateral across the region. This would help lower borrowing costs for Asian governments and corporates, and reduce their foreign exchange risks.
Capturing the four opportunities outlined above will require Hong Kong to develop itself as an international depository and collateral management center. Offering safekeeping for the international securities of Chinese investors would address mainland policymakers’ need for transparency and protection against foreign sanctions. Facilitating the placement and acceptance of mainland Chinese securities of international investors that are already safekept in Hong Kong as collateral in international markets would provide international investors with far greater capital efficiency and liquidity from these holdings, thereby expanding demand for Chinese securities. Playing a central role in the safekeeping and cross-border settlement of renminbi securities would also give Hong Kong a slice of the action on the trading of yuan investment products in other markets, as the global renminbi ecosystem develops. Furthermore, by taking advantage of the scale of Chinese cross-border investment to serve the needs of other Asian countries, Hong Kong could unlock huge opportunities for China, its neighbors in the region, and itself.

Realizing this vision, however, will require developing closer relationships with other financial centers across Asia, reasserting its value to the US and other international constituencies, addressing the potential financial security concerns of other countries, enhancing the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure, and developing and retaining top-tier talent.

Beyond the technical question of connecting its depository infrastructure with regional CSDs to facilitate cross-border settlement and collateral management, if Hong Kong is to play such a strategically important role for China and international capital markets, it must build sound foundations of trust and address the potential concerns of other countries. The city has long played a critical role in serving as a regional hub for US and international corporations doing business in China and across Asia. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of recognition of Hong Kong’s autonomy by the US during the administration of Donald Trump, Hong Kong’s leaders must strive to serve as a bridge between China and the West, helping to increase mutual understanding and resolve disagreements.

But building better relationships requires more than just catering to the commercial interests of other countries. Hong Kong must continue to provide an attractive environment for members of the international community to live and work in, with freedom of movement and expression, as well as rich and diverse cultural offerings, to supplement its robust judicial and regulatory systems.

There should be no illusion that, in the current geopolitically fraught environment, other countries will be willing to rely solely on Hong Kong’s legal and regulatory protections. After all, laws and regulations can be changed. No country today will be willing to support the emergence a financial ecosystem that might give China excessive leverage over them in the future. For Hong Kong to serve as an international depository center, the system must be underpinned by structural protections that guarantee security for all travelers on the global financial highways.

One way in which this could be achieved is through “designed vulnerabilities”, or mutual dependencies, that guarantee that no one country can weaponize the financial system against others without causing catastrophic harm to itself. This could be by splitting core functions within the system across multiple financial centers. For example, where Hong Kong serves as the center of collateral safekeeping and management, and other countries serve as the centers of collateral usage, the operation of the whole system would depend on a nexus between Hong Kong and one or more other jurisdictions. This would limit China’s ability to inflict unilateral sanctions on other countries without seriously damaging its own interests, and vice versa.

Substantial investment will be required to develop and upgrade Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure. The city’s post-trade systems serving the equities and fixed income markets were introduced in the 1990s and, compared with those of other major financial centers, are highly inefficient. But merely a large one-time investment in bringing those systems up to date is insufficient. To foster an environment of innovation that will sustain its long-term competitiveness, Hong Kong must introduce real competition among its financial market operators.

Developing and retaining the talent needed to support all of this will require investment and reforms across Hong Kong’s educational system to ensure that not only the children of affluent families but all young people are given access to world-class education and training.

One factor that has held back innovation in the SAR’s financial markets has been a regulatory philosophy centered on supervising the suitability of financial products and the selling processes of financial intermediaries, but which neglects looking at investors themselves. In an environment of free information and capital flows, rules around product availability that are too restrictive will simply drive investors to other financial centers. By investing in improving financial literacy from an early age and developing a better-informed investing public, Hong Kong could not only better protect its retail investors but also create a deeper professional talent pool for the future.

Finally, Hong Kong needs to rekindle a belief in itself. The city has seen many tough times over its history and experienced numerous existential crises, but it has always bounced back stronger than before. Achieving this ambitious vision to enhance Hong Kong further as a leading international financial center will require marshaling its people’s famed “Lion Rock Spirit” to get the necessary things done.


Source : Asia Global


Read also at Reuters

Brain drain solution is staring Hong Kong in face . . . . .

Chart: U.S. 30-year Mortgage Rate

Pushing the average mortgage payment up almost 50% to $2,500 from around $1,700 at the start of the year.

Source : Bloomberg

Japan’s Africa Aid Rivals China in Terms of ‘Quality Over Quantity’: Analysts

Japan has been investing in the continent for longer than China and applies international standards to its infrastructure financing, analysts said. Its pockets may not be as deep, but its support of good governance and democratic principles makes it a tempting development partner for African states.

Japan might not be able to rival China when it comes to exerting economic influence on the African continent, but analysts say Tokyo can offer an alternative model of development and compete with Beijing on providing infrastructure financing and good governance to international standards. While it may currently seem like Japan is eager to play catch up with China in Africa, they said it has in fact long been one of the most important actors on the continent. Late last month, at the eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Tunisia, Japan pledged US$30 billion in public and private financial contributions to the continent over the next three years.

The move has been widely seen as an attempt to exert economic and diplomatic influence in Africa and counter China’s standing. Speaking via video link, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged to help Africa “urgently deal with issues such as … unfair and opaque development finance”, in what was interpreted as a swipe at China’s lending practices. Beijing has denied that it aims to catch countries in a “debt trap” with its Belt and Road Initiative, as Japan and other Group of 7 members have claimed, with a foreign ministry spokesman saying last month that “the so-called Chinese debt trap is a lie made up by the US and some other Western countries to deflect responsibility and blame”.
Purnendra Jain, visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies, said Japan can offer an alternative development model for Africa. “It is for the African nations to decide for themselves which models appeal to them and are in their national interest,” he said, adding that Japan was a player on the continent even before Beijing launched its Forum of China-Africa Cooperation in 2000. “It’s hard for Japan to compete with China in quantity terms, but Tokyo offers quality projects which are transparent in nature and in partnership with African nations,” Jain said.

Celine Pajon, head of Japan research at the French Institute of International Relations’s Centre for Asian Studies in Paris, said while Japan could not match the amount China was pledging to Africa, Tokyo sought to differentiate itself from Beijing by insisting on quality in its approach to development lending. “Tokyo applies international standards on infrastructure financing, it supports good governance and democratic principles,” Pajon said, adding that Japan also focused on investing in human resources by providing training to African countries instead of exporting its workers like China does.

The number of Chinese workers in Africa peaked at 263,659 in 2015, according to the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies’ China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), but the figure has steadily declined since then. By the end of 2020, it stood at 104,074 – down 43 per cent from the previous year – largely because of pandemic-related travel difficulties. Japan can support Africa’s economic recovery from the pandemic by helping nations build up their fiscal autonomy and working to prevent sovereign and private debt defaults, Pajon said.

“Rather than competing with China, Japan is trying to provide an alternative to what Beijing has to offer,” she said, adding that while the two countries’ investments in infrastructure are complementary, cooperation is not possible as China “does not consider international standards in its development practices. China’s economic expansion is progressing at the expense of human rights and good governance,” Pajon said, referring to civil society criticisms in recent years over China’s failure to promote good governance and human rights despite its strong economic presence on the continent.

Pajon said Japan should continue to train African workers to take advantage of commercial opportunities, and expand its cooperation with third partners such as the European Union, India, Australia, and the United States.


Source : French Institute of Internaational Relations